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COMMENT 
Pressure to Pray? Thinking beyond the 
Coercion Test for Legislator-Led Prayer 
Samuel Taxy† 
The First Amendment to the Constitution commands that “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” This provision is now gener-
ally interpreted to forbid a slew of policies and practices at the federal, state, and 
local levels that endorse or enshrine religion. One flash point in the Establishment 
Clause doctrine is prayer and government. Whereas one line of cases suggests that 
prayer offered at government-sponsored events is unconstitutional if it is coercive, 
another instructs that prayer offered in the legislative context is generally accepta-
ble, at least if delivered by a third party. 
This Comment addresses a burgeoning circuit split regarding the intersection 
of these cases. Lower courts have struggled to come to an adequate answer to the 
question of whether prayer offered in an intimate, constituent-facing legislative 
context by councilmembers themselves is constitutional. This Comment analyzes 
the various prayer cases as two overlapping constitutional prophylactic rules de-
signed to prevent intrusive and time-intensive fact-finding into hard-to-ascertain 
facts. There is also a parallel line of cases that militates against the constitutional-
ity of legislative prayer—the government is supposed to refrain from practices that 
have the potential to be politically divisive. Because prayers delivered by legislators 
themselves are more potentially divisive than those offered by third parties, and 
because the Court prefers strong prophylactic rules designed to prevent judicial 
speculation into factors like the divisiveness of specific prayer content, legislator-
led prayer should be per se forbidden. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When the House of Representatives’ chaplain Reverend 
Patrick Conroy was dismissed in April 2018, theories as to why 
he was fired abounded.1 Some thought that he was fired because 
he was Catholic and because his religion was disfavored.2 Others 
thought he was asked to resign for impliedly criticizing a regres-
sive tax cut bill earlier in the congressional term.3 
Little, if any, of the mainstream commentary countenanced 
an argument that the practice of hiring a congressional pastor 
violated the Constitution.4 Though the Constitution bars any 
“establishment” of religion,5 the practice of having a pastor in 
the House dates back to the First Congress and has been widely 
accepted throughout American history.6 
But this acceptance has not necessarily extended to other 
circumstances in which prayers are offered with the imprima-
tur of government. Most recently, a split has developed among 
the circuit courts as to the constitutionality of prayer at local 
 
 1 See Susan Davis and Tom Gjelten, Ryan’s Dismissal of House Chaplain Sparks 
Outrage and Suspicion (NPR, Apr 27, 2018), online at http://www.npr.org/2018/04/27/ 
606428892/ryans-dismissal-of-house-chaplain-sparks-outrage-and-suspicion (visited Sept 
21, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 2 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Elizabeth Dias, Ryan Reinstates House Chaplain 
after Priest Decided to Fight Dismissal, NY Times A14 (May 3, 2018). 
 3 See Elizabeth Dias, House Chaplain Was Asked to Resign. He Still Doesn’t Know 
Why. (NY Times, Apr, 26, 2018), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/26/us/ 
politics/patrick-conroy-paul-ryan-house-chaplain.html (visited Sept 21, 2018) (Perma 
archive unavailable). 
 4 See, for example, Wendy Cadge and Laura R. Olson, How Does Congress’ Chaplain 
Not Violate Separation of Church and State? (Newsweek, May 2, 2018), archived at 
http://perma.cc/V9EM-2AQA (explaining that, while chaplaincies have been controver-
sial at times, the law on congressional chaplains is well settled). 
 5 US Const Amend I. 
 6 See Town of Greece v Galloway, 572 US 565, 574–77 (2014). 
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government meetings led exclusively by the leaders of local gov-
ernment themselves.7 
On March 12, 2013, Nancy Lund sued Rowan County, North 
Carolina for violating the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment.8 Peter Bormuth filed a similar suit on August 30, 
2013 against Jackson County, Michigan.9 Both suits presented 
similar facts and legal theories. The respective plaintiffs attended 
county board of commissioners meetings at which the commis-
sioners themselves began the proceedings with prayer. These 
prayers were frequently sectarian in nature, and the only reli-
gion represented was Christianity.10 Both plaintiffs sought relief 
via 42 USC § 1983, arguing that the practice of beginning the 
meeting with prayer established the religion of Christianity and 
violated the First Amendment.11 
The state of Establishment Clause doctrine is uncertain, es-
pecially as applied to legislative prayer.12 Though the Constitution 
forbids Congress from making any “law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion,” the Court has not clarified how far this 
prohibition extends beyond literal congressional lawmaking, 
which has led to a doctrinal thicket of overlapping and at times 
contradictory tests.13 The clause extends to state and local gov-
ernment through the Fourteenth Amendment and applies to 
actions carried out by the state or state employees (not just 
lawmaking).14 
 
 7 Compare Lund v Rowan County, 863 F3d 268, 275 (4th Cir 2017) (en banc) (hold-
ing that the legislature’s prayer practice violated the Establishment Clause), with 
Bormuth v County of Jackson, 870 F3d 494, 498 (6th Cir 2017) (en banc) (holding that a 
similar practice did not violate the Establishment Clause). 
 8 Complaint against Rowan County, Lund v Rowan County, No 1:13-CV-00207, 
*1–2 (MD NC filed Mar 12, 2013) (Lund Complaint). 
 9 Complaint against County of Jackson, Bormuth v County of Jackson, No 2:13-
CV-13726, *1–2 (ED Mich filed Aug 30, 2013) (Bormuth Complaint). 
 10 Lund Complaint at *2 (cited in note 8); Bormuth Complaint at *2 (cited in note 9). 
 11 Lund Complaint at *2 (cited in note 8); Bormuth Complaint at *3 (cited in note 9). 
 12 See Richard H. Fallon Jr, Tiers for the Establishment Clause, 166 U Pa L Rev 59, 62 
n 9 (2017) (noting that the leading legislative prayer case defies traditional Establishment 
Clause approaches). 
 13 See id at 60 (“Establishment Clause doctrine is notoriously confused and disar-
rayed.”); Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court’s Four Establishment Clauses, 8 
U Pa J Const L 725, 725 (2006) (“It is by now axiomatic that the Supreme Court’s 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is a mess—both hopelessly confused and deeply 
contradictory.”). See also Rowan County v Lund, 138 S Ct 2564, 2564 (2018) (Thomas 
dissenting) (“This Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in disarray.”). 
 14 For Fourteenth Amendment incorporation, see Everson v Board of Education 
of the Township of Ewing, 330 US 1, 8 (1947). For extension beyond legislation, see, 
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But in the two leading Supreme Court cases, legislative 
prayer has been held to be constitutionally permissible. In 
Marsh v Chambers,15 the Court upheld the Nebraska state legis-
lature’s 100-year-old practice of hiring a pastor to deliver prayers 
over a lengthy dissent by Justice William Brennan.16 More 
recently, the Supreme Court decided Town of Greece v Galloway,17 
which dealt with similar circumstances: a town invited local 
clergy to deliver prayers at the beginning of the town council 
meeting, and all of the invitees were Christian.18 The Court held 
that this practice did not violate the Establishment Clause, 
though no reasoning garnered a majority of the Court.19 
Town of Greece did little to settle the legal terrain in the 
pending claims in Lund’s and Bormuth’s respective lawsuits. 
Following the Town of Greece decision, both cases went en banc 
in their respective circuits, generating a total of nine opinions 
sharply split on what legal test should be applied and on the 
outcome.20 The two cases led to a circuit split as to whether sec-
tarian prayer offered by a councilmember (as opposed to a third 
party) is subject to a different legal standard than that out-
lined in Town of Greece.21 Although both cases, Lund v Rowan 
County22 from the Fourth Circuit and Bormuth v County of 
 
for example, Lee v Weisman, 505 US 577, 597–99 (1992) (holding that prayer by a rabbi 
at a public school graduation violated the Establishment Clause). 
 15 463 US 783 (1983). 
 16 Id at 795 (Brennan dissenting). 
 17 572 US 565 (2014). 
 18 Id at 611–12 (Breyer dissenting) (noting that, between 1999 and 2007, the prayers 
were exclusively Christian, and that thereafter, four non-Christian prayers were given 
but only after the plaintiffs in the case complained). 
 19 See id at 567. See also id at 603–10 (Thomas concurring) (offering competing ra-
tionales for allowing the prayers in question). 
 20 See generally Lund, 863 F3d 268; Bormuth, 870 F3d 494. 
 21 Aside from the two cases constituting this split, others have recently addressed 
the issue. See Williamson v Brevard County, 2017 WL 4404444, *14–19 (MD Fla) (dis-
cussing concerns with how the county selects prayer givers); Hudson v Pittsylvania 
County, 107 F Supp 3d 524, 541 (WD Va 2015) (upholding an injunction prohibiting 
councilmembers from delivering sectarian prayers at their meetings). Moreover, a major-
ity of counties in the Fourth Circuit have allowed legislative-led prayer “on at least some 
occasions.” Brief of Amici Curiae State of West Virginia and 12 Other States Supporting 
Defendant-Appellant, Lund v Rowan County, No 15-1591, *15 (4th Cir filed Aug 3, 2015). 
Information regarding legislative prayer is less consistently available for the Sixth Circuit, 
but it appears as though it is widespread. For those counties from which information could 
be gathered, almost 40 percent had legislator-led prayer. Brief of Amici Curiae State of 
Michigan and Twenty-One Other States in Support of Jackson County and Affirmance, 
Bormuth v County of Jackson, No 15-1869, *10–12 (6th Cir filed May 1, 2017). 
 22 863 F3d 268 (4th Cir 2017) (en banc). 
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Jackson23 from the Sixth Circuit, were appealed to the Supreme 
Court, certiorari was denied in both cases (over an impassioned 
dissent by Justice Clarence Thomas in the former).24 It does not 
appear as though the lower courts will have further guidance in 
the near future. 
This Comment seeks to untangle the Supreme Court’s ju-
risprudence regarding legislative prayer by focusing on sec-
tarian prayer offered by lawmakers in intimate settings (such 
as municipal or county council meetings). Part I describes the 
Establishment Clause and the legal standards applied by the 
Court in various settings, focusing on prayer in particular. This 
Comment considers the doctrinal wrinkles surrounding govern-
ment and prayer through the lens of constitutional prophylactic 
rules. Part II further homes in on the circuit split regarding 
prayer led by lawmakers in intimate settings. Finally, Part III 
offers a solution to this split, concluding that the Constitution 
forbids legislative prayer in intimate forums in which the identity 
of the prayer givers are directly determined by elections or other 
direct political processes. 
I.  THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND ITS ATTENDANT TESTS 
The First Amendment to the US Constitution commands 
that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion.”25 The Establishment Clause is binding on the states 
 
 23 870 F3d 494 (6th Cir 2017) (en banc). 
 24 See generally Lund, 138 S Ct 2564; Bormuth v Jackson County, 138 S Ct 
2708 (2018). 
 25 US Const Amend I. The First Amendment also contains a provision ensuring 
that Congress may not pass a law “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion; the so-called 
Free Exercise Clause is a doctrinally distinct provision, which is outside of the scope of 
this Comment. Some, however, have astutely noted that there is one area of overlap be-
tween these two clauses that is especially germane to legislative prayer: the extent of the 
coercion test that I describe below. Briefly, a government practice that coerces some form 
of religious observance can be framed as either an establishment of religion or an in-
fringement on others’ free exercise rights. Thus, some have even argued that the coer-
cion test should be considered part of the Court’s Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence as 
opposed to its Establishment Clause jurisprudence. While this line of reasoning raises 
intriguing questions about the internal consistency of recent First Amendment decisions 
and the meaning of a freestanding Establishment Clause that is in some applications 
concomitant with Free Exercise jurisprudence, these issues are outside the scope of this 
Comment. Regardless of whether or not coercion is the “right” Establishment Clause test 
in some cases, it is what the Court has used. For a discussion of the view that the coer-
cion test is subsumed within the Free Exercise Clause, see, for example, Lee v Weisman, 
505 US 577, 604–09 (1992) (Blackmun concurring). 
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through the Fourteenth Amendment.26 Thus, the clause applies 
to state and local authorities. 
Likewise, the Establishment Clause applies to policies and 
practices, not just to legislation. Specifically, the Court has ruled 
that prayer offered at government functions or with the impri-
matur of the government may run afoul of the Constitution—
even if there is not a law establishing religion in and of itself.27 
The Supreme Court has applied sundry tests to potential es-
tablishments of religion.28 Here, the most salient tests are the 
Lemon test29 and the coercion test.30 These tests somewhat over-
lap, and though neither has been explicitly overruled or elevated 
to primacy, the controlling opinion in Town of Greece relied pri-
marily on the coercion test.31 In the legislative prayer context, 
the Court also uses a third, somewhat amorphous, test: histori-
cal pedigree.32 There are several other tests, or permutations 
thereof, that do not get consistently applied in the legislative 
prayer context, including the endorsement33 and neutrality34 
tests. The former is frequently seen as a variation of one of the 
prongs of the Lemon test.35 The latter is a value that suffuses 
each of the Court’s Establishment Clause decisions36 but can 
sometimes be considered its own test, particularly when consid-
ering government practices and procedures that affect religious 
 
 26 Everson v Board of Education of the Township of Ewing, 330 US 1, 8 (1947) (in-
corporating the Establishment Clause). 
 27 See Weisman, 505 US at 597–99 (holding that prayer offered at a public high 
school graduation violated the Establishment Clause). 
 28 See Gey, 8 U Pa J Const L at 728 (cited in note 13). Professor Steven Gey counts 
ten separate tests. 
 29 See Lemon v Kurtzman, 403 US 602, 612–13 (1971). 
 30 See Weisman, 505 US at 587. 
 31 Town of Greece, 572 US at 589–90 (Kennedy) (plurality). 
 32 See, for example, Marsh, 463 US at 793. 
 33 See Lynch v Donnelly, 465 US 668, 691–94 (1984) (O’Connor concurring). 
 34 See Zelman v Simmons-Harris, 536 US 639, 649–53 (2002). 
 35 See, for example, Lynch, 465 US at 691–92 (O’Connor concurring). See also Doe v 
Elmbrook School District, 687 F3d 840, 849–50 (7th Cir 2012) (en banc) (“In accord with 
further Supreme Court precedent approving of the endorsement approach, . . . we have 
viewed the endorsement test as a legitimate part of Lemon’s second prong.”); Allison 
Hugi, Comment, A Borderline Case: The Establishment Clause Implications of Religious 
Questioning by Government Officials, 85 U Chi L Rev 193, 206 (2018) (discussing the en-
dorsement test). 
 36 See, for example, McCreary County v American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 
545 US 844, 860 (2005) (“The touchstone for our analysis is the principle that the ‘First 
Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and be-
tween religion and nonreligion.’”). 
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institutions or practices.37 In other words, these other tests are 
useful in understanding the patchwork of the Court’s 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence but are not as comprehen-
sive as the Lemon test and bear less directly on prayer at gov-
ernment functions. 
A. The Lemon Test 
The Lemon test, announced in Lemon v Kurtzman,38 is a 
three-part test to determine the constitutionality of a contested 
law or practice.39 In order for a government activity to pass con-
stitutional muster, per Lemon, (1) it “must have a secular legis-
lative purpose,”40 (2) “its principal or primary effect must be one 
that neither advances nor inhibits religion,”41 and (3) it “must not 
foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.”42 
If the practice meets those three prongs, it is not a viola-
tion of the Establishment Clause per Lemon. In Lemon, the 
Court ruled on the constitutionality of, among other things, a 
Pennsylvania state statute. The statute “provide[d] financial 
support to nonpublic elementary and secondary schools by way 
of reimbursement for the cost of teachers’ salaries, textbooks, 
and instructional materials in specified secular subjects”; in 
reaching nonpublic schools, the statute funded secular as well as 
religious institutions.43 The law required rigorous accounting as 
to what money was being spent on which costs. For the first 
Lemon prong, the Court reasoned that the legislation had a sec-
ular purpose, as the legislation purported to improve all nonpub-
lic education.44 The Court declined to apply the second prong, as 
the statute failed the third prong.45 
The Court interpreted the third prong in two ways: First, 
the state may not oversee and meddle in religious affairs.46 
 
 37 See, for example, Zelman, 536 US at 649–52 (noting that previous cases “thus 
make clear that where a government aid program is neutral with respect to religion, . . . 
the program is not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause.”). But 
see Hugi, Comment, 85 U Chi L Rev at 206 (cited in note 35) (arguing that neutrality is 
no more than a value and is therefore not a test). 
 38 403 US 602 (1971). 
 39 Id at 612–13. 
 40 Id at 612. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Lemon, 403 US at 613 (quotation marks omitted). 
 43 Id at 606–07. 
 44 Id at 613. 
 45 Id at 613–14. 
 46 Lemon, 403 US at 614–15. 
150 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:151 
 
Second, a law may lead to entanglement if it has “divisive politi-
cal potential.”47 The Pennsylvania statute failed this prong be-
cause the “restrictions and surveillance necessary” to comply 
with the law fostered entanglements by forcing state actors to 
police the accounting practices of religious schools.48 
The divisive political potential aspect of the entanglement 
prong can also apply in instances in which religion is intermingled 
with majoritarian decision-making, such as voting. For example, 
in Santa Fe Independent School District v Doe,49 the Court consid-
ered a public school district’s proposed policy of allowing students 
to vote on who would give invocations at high school football 
games.50 Although this aspect of the policy was officially neutral 
toward religion, it nonetheless contravened the Establishment 
Clause because it invited rancorous sectarianism.51  
The immediacy of the decision-making is often relevant in de-
ciding how divisive a government expression of religion is. This 
thread in the divisiveness prong is illustrated by Van Orden v 
Perry52 and McCreary County v American Civil Liberties Union 
of Kentucky.53 Decided the same day, both cases involved a dis-
play of the Decalogue (also called the Ten Commandments) on 
state property. Justice Stephen Breyer provided the critical fifth 
vote in each case, voting to forbid Kentucky’s display in 
McCreary County while opting to not mess with Texas’s in Van 
Orden.54 He highlighted a couple distinguishing factors. First, the 
Texas display did not advance a particular religion and was part 
of a broader installation, whereas the Kentucky display was more 
explicitly Christian and more focused on the Decalogue.55 Second, 
 
 47 Id at 622. 
 48 Id at 620–21. 
 49 530 US 290 (2000). 
 50 Id at 304–07. See notes 88–95 and accompanying text. 
 51 Santa Fe, 530 US at 309–10. Other cases have diminished the importance of the 
third Lemon prong. See, for example, Agostini v Felton, 521 US 203, 221–22 (1997) (re-
casting the “entanglement” prong as part of the “secular purpose” prong). 
 52 545 US 677 (2005). 
 53 545 US 844 (2005). 
 54 See Van Orden, 545 US at 698 (Breyer concurring) (distinguishing the two displays). 
 55 See id at 701–03 (Breyer concurring) (explaining that the Texas Decalogue display 
was donated by a largely secular organization as part of a park with thirty-eight monuments 
and markers intended to illustrate Texas’s history and ideals, and that the text surrounding 
the Decalogue was secular). In contrast, in McCreary County, the Decalogue was part of a 
single display by itself, which was later augmented to include other components that fur-
thered its religious nature, such as “an excerpt from President Lincoln’s ‘Reply to Loyal 
Colored People of Baltimore upon Presentation of a Bible,’ reading that ‘[t]he Bible is the 
best gift God has ever given to man.’” McCreary County, 545 US at 851–54. 
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the Texas display had been around for decades, whereas the 
decision-makers in Kentucky had only recently debated the mon-
ument’s content during a politically fraught approval process.56 
Professor Richard Fallon explains Justice Breyer’s vote in the 
case as standing for the proposition that long-standing govern-
ment practices supporting religion are tolerable but that new at-
tempts to bring in similar practices violate the Constitution.57 In 
other words, the Court prefers to let sleeping dogs lie, while 
newer or frequent changes to policy or content are viewed more 
skeptically. Changes in the relationship between church and 
state bring interdenominational and religious strife to the fore. 
Encouraging politicians and voters to frequently revisit the po-
litical and constitutional compromises made yesteryear would 
promote backlash from all quarters, paradoxically fomenting the 
type of the divisiveness the Lemon test forbids.58 
While the full Lemon test is erratically used in the Supreme 
Court and doctrinal evolution began to erode it almost as soon 
as it was announced,59 the themes embedded within it suffuse 
the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence. For example, 
as this Part explains, the Court may turn to endorsement with-
out applying the full Lemon test. Likewise, the Court balks at 
judicial oversight of religious observance, lest it unnecessarily 
“entangle” the government in others’ religious observance.60 Thus, 
applying Lemon to a case like legislative prayer may superficially 
seem simple but raises questions about when the courts should 
become involved in policing long-standing practices. 
B. Prophylactic Rules and Coercion 
The current case law distinguishes between two types of co-
ercion: direct and indirect.61 Under current Supreme Court prec-
edent, “The Establishment Clause . . . does not depend upon 
 
 56 See Van Orden, 545 US at 702–03; McCreary County, 545 US at 851–57. 
 57 Richard H. Fallon Jr, A Salute to Justice Breyer’s Concurring Opinion in Van 
Orden v. Perry, 128 Harv L Rev 429, 431 (2014). 
 58 See id at 431–32. 
 59 See Gey, 8 U Pa J Const L at 731–32 (cited in note 13). See also Santa Fe, 530 
US at 319–20 (Rehnquist dissenting) (describing Lemon’s “checkered career in the deci-
sional law” of the Supreme Court). 
 60 See Town of Greece, 572 US at 586 (“The quest to promote a diversity of religious 
views would require the town to make wholly inappropriate judgments about the number 
of religions [it] should sponsor[,] . . . a form of government entanglement with religion 
that is far more troublesome than the current approach.”) (quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
 61 See, for example, Engel v Vitale, 370 US 421, 430–31 (1962). 
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any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated 
by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion 
whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving indi-
viduals or not.”62 In other words, the threshold for passing the 
coercion test is the lower bar of indirect coercion, and even state 
laws that do not directly coerce religious behavior may violate 
the First Amendment.63 
The coercion test is frequently used to determine whether 
prayers sponsored by the government or provided in government 
fora violate the Establishment Clause. Unlike the Lemon test, 
there are no formal criteria; instead the Court looks to the ex-
tent of supervision and social pressures to participate. In two 
cases, the Court has held that even nonsectarian prayer can vio-
late the Establishment Clause because it coerces participation.64 
Both cases involved minors; however, the Court did not indicate 
that the coercion test should be applied exclusively in situations 
involving minors. This Comment considers the presence of mi-
nors along with other aspects of the Court’s review of these prac-
tices,65 but age alone fails to provide a satisfactory answer to the 
Court’s reasoning and holdings in these cases. Rather, this 
Comment suggests a complementary framework: prophylactic 
rules. 
The coercive prayer and legislative prayer cases both 
evince the characteristics of constitutional prophylactic rules. 
As argued by Professor David Strauss, prophylactic rules are 
ubiquitous in constitutional jurisprudence; these rules are de-
signed to be deliberately overinclusive to protect core constitu-
tional values.66 Strauss’s seminal article focuses on the prophy-
lactic rule in Miranda v Arizona,67 which requires police officers 
to inform criminal suspects of their rights to remain silent and 
consult counsel during custodial interrogations.68 While this 
 
 62 Id at 430. 
 63 But see Town of Greece, 572 US at 609–10 (Thomas concurring) (arguing that 
most of the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence is misbegotten and that legal 
coercion is a more appropriate test in most circumstances). See also note 126 for a dis-
cussion of the direct coercion test’s relevance as a controlling opinion. And see note 25 for 
a discussion of the potential overlap between the coercion test and the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment. 
 64 See Weisman, 505 US at 599; Santa Fe, 530 US at 317. 
 65 See notes 99, 230, and accompanying text. 
 66 See generally David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U Chi L 
Rev 190 (1988). 
 67 384 US 436 (1966). 
 68 Id at 444. 
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warning requirement cannot be found in the Fifth Amendment, 
the Court nonetheless requires it because it helps guide lower 
courts’ decision-making and avoids laborious factfinding about 
whether the other aspects of the interrogation violated due 
process.69 To use Strauss’s language, prophylactic rules like 
Miranda are broader than the “real” constitutional provision 
they are designed to enforce.70 Miranda itself bars otherwise le-
gitimately obtained confessions from being used in court. 
Another area of constitutional law with ubiquitous prophy-
lactic rules is freedom of speech. The Court is extremely skepti-
cal of content-based restrictions, applying a “nearly conclusive 
presumption against [their] constitutionality.”71 This is not be-
cause the First Amendment itself distinguishes between 
content-based and content-neutral speech restrictions.72 Rather, 
the freedom of speech is a core constitutional value, and it is ex-
ceptionally difficult to discern what actually motivates legisla-
tures when they make restrictions on speech content.73 Again, 
the “real” constitutional provision is that Congress should not 
write laws barring certain kinds of politically disfavored 
speech74—but because courts cannot always determine what the 
intention and effect are, the Court has established a strong 
prophylactic rule disfavoring all content-based restrictions. The 
analogy between prophylactic rules protecting the freedom of 
speech and those prohibiting the establishment of religion is apt. 
Both constitutional provisions are located within the First 
Amendment and are designed (to a certain extent) to prevent a 
majoritarian body from prescribing what thoughts and expres-
sions are orthodox.75 These values are both core to American 
democracy and easily subverted by pretextual legislation—and 
are thus deserving of strong prophylactic protection. 
 
 69 See Strauss, 55 U Chi L Rev at 205 (cited in note 66). 
 70 Id at 201–02. 
 71 Id at 198. 
 72 See US Const Amend I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom 
of speech.”). 
 73 See Strauss, 55 U Chi L Rev at 200 (cited in note 66). 
 74 See West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette, 319 US 624, 642 (1943) 
(“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or 
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other 
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”) (em-
phasis added). 
 75 See id. 
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Across various constitutional contexts, prophylactic rules have 
many of the same hallmarks.76 They consider the institutional 
propensities and strengths of the various branches.77 Most im-
portantly, when the constitutional provision in question would 
require extensive judicial factfinding, or even judicial omnisci-
ence, the Court will establish a rule to avoid having to divine ac-
tors’ true motivations or subtle actions.78 These questions are 
also weighed against the importance of the constitutional value 
at stake.79 Likewise, the Court sometimes establishes a “prophy-
lactic rule [that] operates in reverse”; such  rules “uphold legis-
lation that the ‘real’ Constitution would invalidate.”80 Similarly, 
prophylactic rules in reverse consider the propensities of institu-
tional actors.81 As this Section and Part II.B discuss, although 
the government prayer cases discuss factual inquiries, the hold-
ings and legal rules bear the hallmarks of prophylactic rules. 
In Lee v Weisman,82 the Court held that nonsectarian reli-
gious prayers offered at a nonrequired school function still vio-
late the Establishment Clause because they are coercive.83 A 
rabbi offered an opening prayer at a middle school graduation. 
The prayer’s content was broadly religious but not sectarian—
calling upon “God” and “Lord” but not discussing particularly 
Jewish dogma or creed.84 The Court found government coercion 
in the fact that this occurred at a school graduation: there are 
already “heightened concerns” about coerced prayer in the public 
school context; students had no obvious way to avoid participat-
ing or appearing to participate; and the school district’s “super-
vision and control” of the event placed public and peer pressure 
on students to stand or maintain silence during the prayer.85 
The Court did not rest its holding exclusively on the plaintiff’s 
 
 76 See Strauss, 55 U Chi L Rev at 195–200, 204–05 (cited in note 66) (discussing 
prophylactic rules in the context of custodial interrogations, pamphleteering, where 
and about what people may protest, the First Amendment generally, and race-based 
classifications). 
 77 See id at 208. 
 78 See id at 202 (discussing how the Court’s treatment of the ordinance at issue in 
Police Department of the City of Chicago v Mosley, 408 US 92 (1972), illustrates an at-
tempt to protect the government from discriminating against a particular point of view). 
 79 See id at 207–09.  
 80 Strauss, 55 U Chi L Rev at 206–07 (cited in note 66), citing Oregon v Mitchell, 
400 US 112 (1970) (providing an example of a prophylactic rule operating in reverse). 
 81 Strauss, 55 U Chi L Rev at 204–05. 
 82 505 US 577 (1992).  
 83 Id at 586–87. 
 84 See id at 581–82. 
 85 Id at 592–93. 
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age or the school-based setting, noting that any government co-
ercion of religious practice would violate the Establishment 
Clause.86 That is, the Court preferred to consider the totality of 
the circumstances in determining whether students were co-
erced rather than resting its holding on the well-established 
principle that classroom prayer is outright forbidden.87 
The Court also recently applied the coercion test to find a 
violation of the Establishment Clause in Santa Fe.88 In this case, 
a student challenged the school district’s practice of allowing 
students serving on the student council to deliver prayers prior 
to each home football game.89 Applying the coercion principles 
outlined in Weisman, the Court held that the prayer practice 
was similar to that disallowed in Weisman.90 
The Court also dismissed several potentially distinguishing 
factors. First, though the school did not pick the speakers directly 
(as in Weisman), the election of speakers through majoritarian 
means “encourage[d] divisiveness along religious lines in a public 
school setting” and therefore also ran afoul of the Constitution.91 
Second, the Court dismissed the argument that student attend-
ance at football games was less mandatory than attendance at a 
high school graduation,92 reasoning that attendance at school-
sanctioned extracurricular activities is a normal part of student 
life93 but further held that the prayers would still have been co-
ercive even if attendance were “purely voluntary.”94 Although 
the school district had a fallback option that did not mention 
prayer at all, the Court also struck that provision down because 
the rest of the policy was close enough to prayer.95 
 
 86 See Weisman, 505 US at 592. 
 87 See id at 596. See also generally William P. Marshall, The Constitutionality of 
School Prayer: Or Why Engel v. Vitale May Have Had It Right All Along, 46 Cap U L 
Rev 339 (2018) (arguing that Weisman and Santa Fe should never have introduced coer-
cion and instead should have rested on an antidivisiveness rationale). 
 88 Santa Fe, 530 US at 310–12. 
 89 See id at 297–98. The policy was written as if the school board was anticipating 
litigation and had several fallback options. For example, it allowed for sectarian prayer, 
but should that policy be enjoined, the district’s policy would revert to allowing only non-
sectarian prayer. Should that be enjoined, the policy would shift to allowing various 
“messages,” “statements,” and “invocations.” Id. 
 90 See id at 305. 
 91 Id at 311. 
 92 Santa Fe, 530 US at 311–12. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id at 312. 
 95 Id at 313–16 (invalidating an alternative policy that did not mention prayer but 
nonetheless called for students to “solemnize” football games beforehand). 
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These cases analyzed the legal issue through the lens of co-
ercion, but they did not conduct any factual inquiries into 
whether coercion actually occurred. In Santa Fe, the policies 
were hypothetical—the policy had yet to be implemented, and no 
prayers or meditations were offered.96 And in Weisman, the 
Court did not engage in an extended analysis of how the chore-
ography of the graduation and prayer content gave rise to a co-
ercive environment.97 Indeed, in Weisman, the prayer was non-
sectarian and only faintly religious, and there was no evidence 
that the plaintiff was uncomfortable, let alone coerced.98 
The Court’s spare treatment of the actual facts of these cases 
supports the theory that the Court prefers to deploy prophylactic 
rules in this area of law. The Court is ill-suited to analyze the 
coercive potential in government-sponsored prayers because do-
ing so requires a rich record and intensive factfinding into the 
subjective mental states of those in attendance. An analysis of 
coercion in fact would have to consider in isolation and in com-
bination the motivations of the prayer-giving government entity, 
its actions, and the subjective mental state of audience mem-
bers. Thus, Justice Antonin Scalia was absolutely correct when 
he wrote in dissent in Weisman that “the Court has gone beyond 
the realm where judges know what they are doing” by dabbling 
in “psychology practiced by amateurs.”99 But that is exactly the 
point. Because courts lack the institutional capacity to determine 
each actor’s motivations and sensitivities, the Court appropriately 
laid out a strong prophylactic rule forbidding religious prayers 
when children may be explicitly or implicitly cajoled into bending 
their religious practices to meet those of school administrators. 
The problem compounds in cases like Santa Fe, in which 
prayers are to be repeated with regularity; presumably a review-
ing court would have to inquire into the subjective mental states 
of the prayer givers and attendees at each football game. Thus, 
in each of these cases, the Court did not attempt to discern 
whether anyone was actually coerced to do anything. Santa Fe is 
especially instructive: the Court blocked the entire practice 
prophylactically even though the policy had a fallback option 
 
 96 Santa Fe, 530 US at 314 (rejecting the idea that the prayer policy “cannot be invali-
dated on the basis of some ‘possibility or even likelihood’ of an unconstitutional application”). 
 97 Compare Weisman, 505 US at 593 (offering a high-level assertion that this was co-
ercive based on assumed facts), with Town of Greece, 572 US at 588–90 (offering a very de-
tailed discussion of what kinds of factors, taken together, could inform a coercion analysis). 
 98 See Weisman, 505 US at 581–83. 
 99 Id at 636 (Scalia dissenting). 
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that did not even fully authorize prayer.100 As in the equal pro-
tection realm, majoritarian decision-making looms large over 
the Establishment Clause, further explaining these prophylactic 
rules; the Court is concerned that a majority group will use 
seemingly neutral policies to discriminate against an out-
group.101 
In sum, the strong prophylactic rules laid out in Weisman 
and Santa Fe seem to cut wider than examining whether a gov-
ernment agent actually indirectly coerced somebody to partici-
pate in a religious activity. But these two cases do not make 
clear what facts trigger this preclusive rule or whether the prin-
ciples of coercion should also apply to legislative prayer. It is 
also worth noting that, apart from Weisman and Santa Fe, the 
Court has a robust line of cases that forbid religious expression 
and instruction in public schools.102 These earlier cases do not 
discuss indirect coercion as a rationale or test (and in some cases 
explicitly set aside coercion), suggesting that the prophylactic 
rules surrounding public prayer differ from the Court’s categori-
cal ban on prayer in a public schoolhouse.103 
II.  LEGISLATIVE PRAYER AND LEGISLATOR-LED PRAYER 
In the two leading cases regarding legislative prayer, Town 
of Greece and Marsh, the Supreme Court held the practices con-
stitutional. The Court did not consistently apply any of the 
above tests in these cases. In Marsh, the Court appeared to ac-
cept the practice as presumptively constitutional, based on the 
First Congress hiring a pastor as it finalized the language of 
what would become the Bill of Rights.104 In Town of Greece, the 
controlling opinion applied a form of the “indirect coercion” test 
 
 100 Santa Fe, 530 US at 308–09. 
 101 See Strauss, 55 U Chi L Rev at 204–05 (cited in note 66). 
 102 See, for example, Engel, 370 US at 424; School District of Abington Township v 
Schempp, 374 US 203, 223 (1963); Epperson v Arkansas, 393 US 97, 103 (1968); Wallace 
v Jaffree, 472 US 38, 56 (1985). See also Engel, 370 US at 438–42 (Douglas concurring) 
(explaining that coercion is not necessary to invalidate prayer in school). 
 103 See note 100 and accompanying text. See also Jaffree, 472 US at 72 (O’Connor 
concurring) (explaining that earlier religion and school decisions “expressly turned only 
on the fact that the government was sponsoring a manifestly religious exercise” notwith-
standing any implicit coercion that may have been present). See also Marshall, 46 Cap U 
L Rev at 341 (cited in note 87) (contrasting the rationales of earlier school prayer cases 
with those of Weisman and Santa Fe). 
 104 Marsh, 463 US at 787–88. 
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but failed to garner a majority of the Court.105 Each of these cases 
considers prayers delivered by third parties. As such, no Court 
case directly controls the factual circumstance that underlies this 
Comment, namely legislators themselves leading prayer. 
A. Marsh v Chambers: A Carveout for Historical Practices 
Though the Court has never held that the Lemon test is in-
applicable to legislative prayer,106 it has strongly implied that its 
applicability is at least limited when the practice has a long his-
torical pedigree. In Marsh, the Nebraska state legislature paid a 
pastor to deliver prayers at its legislative sessions.107 This prac-
tice was a century old,108 and the same Presbyterian pastor had 
been retained for the two decades preceding suit.109 The prayers 
were offered in the official legislative chamber before the official 
start of the workday, and the legislators (let alone any observ-
ers) did not need to be present.110 
The Court’s decision ignored the Lemon test except to note 
that the lower court applied that test.111 Rather, the majority opin-
ion in Marsh located the constitutionality of legislative prayer in 
the First Congress, which also hired a pastor to deliver prayers 
almost immediately after ratifying the First Amendment.112 The 
Court did acknowledge that there were contemporaneous objec-
tions to legislative prayer during the process of constitutional 
ratification and that two of the authors of the Federalist Papers 
opposed the practice at various points in their respective ca-
reers.113 But Marsh downplayed these undercurrents and held 
 
 105 This Comment treats Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion, which applied the in-
direct coercion test, as the controlling plurality opinion under Marks v United States, 430 
US 188 (1977). See note 126 and accompanying text. 
 106 See generally Town of Greece, 572 US 565; Marsh, 463 US 783. 
 107 See Marsh, 463 US at 784–85. 
 108 See id at 790. 
 109 See id at 785. 
 110 See Chambers v Marsh, 504 F Supp 585, 590 & n 12 (D Neb 1980). 
 111 See Marsh, 463 US at 786. See also id at 796 (Brennan dissenting). 
 112 See id at 787–88. 
 113 For contemporaneous objections, see id at 791 n 12 (“It also could be noted that 
objections to prayer were raised, apparently successfully, in Pennsylvania while ratifica-
tion of the Constitution was debated.”). For noncontemporaneous objections raised by 
former President James Madison and then-delegate John Jay, see id at 791 & n 12; id at 
807–08 (Brennan dissenting) (quoting Madison as writing, “Is the appointment of Chap-
lains to the two Houses of Congress consistent with the Constitution, and with the pure 
principle of religious freedom? In strictness, the answer on both points must be in the 
negative”). 
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that the practices of the First Congress are determinative.114 In 
other words, the First Congress’s “actions reveal their intent”: if 
hiring a minister to deliver prayers contravened the 
Establishment Clause, they would not have done it.115 
A forceful dissent by Justice Brennan argued that this histo-
ry is not compelling and instead applied the Lemon test, finding 
that legislative prayer fails on all three prongs. First, the purpose 
of retaining a pastor is religious, and not secular, in nature.116 Se-
cond, the primary effect is to advance religion.117 Finally, legisla-
tive prayer fails both aspects of the final prong: the legislature 
might have to police the pastor’s prayers to ensure that they do 
not cross lines of acceptability, and the selection of pastors from 
the several denominations and religions has “divisive political 
potential.”118 
B. Town of Greece v Galloway 
The most recent case—and source of the current circuit 
split—regarding legislative prayer is Town of Greece. Greece, a 
hamlet in upstate New York, instituted a prayer session at the 
beginning of its town board meetings.119 The town followed an 
“informal” method of identifying potential prayer-giving volun-
teers by calling up local religious institutions, finding someone 
available to pray at that month’s meeting, and then compiling a 
list of individuals available to be called on in the future.120 Until 
litigation began, every volunteer prayer giver was Christian, 
and many of the prayers were overtly sectarian.121 Later, a rabbi, 
a Wiccan priestess, and a chairman of the local Baha’i temple 
gave prayers at the town board meetings.122 
The plaintiffs in the case sought to limit the holding of Marsh 
and distinguished Greece’s practices in several ways. First, they 
argued that Marsh authorized only nonsectarian prayer, whereas 
Greece’s volunteers gave openly sectarian prayers.123 Second, the 
 
 114 See Marsh, 463 US at 792. 
 115 Id at 790. 
 116 See id at 797 (Brennan dissenting). 
 117 See id at 798 (Brennan dissenting). 
 118 Marsh, 463 US at 798–800 (Brennan dissenting). 
 119 See Town of Greece, 572 US at 570. 
 120 See id at 571. 
 121 See id. 
 122 See id at 572. 
 123 See Town of Greece, 572 US at 579, discussing County of Allegheny v American 
Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 US 573 (1989). 
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plaintiffs argued that the fact that only Christian leaders were 
invited to give prayers ran afoul of the endorsement prong of the 
Lemon test and the principle of government neutrality toward 
religion.124 Finally, the prayers in Marsh occurred in a remote leg-
islative chamber, whereas Greece held only town board meetings, 
at which constituents openly petitioned their local representa-
tives. Because citizens attended these intimate meetings to per-
sonally petition the board, a prayer at the beginning, the plain-
tiffs argued, was coercive.125 
The Court rejected all three of these arguments in a five-to-
four vote and held that Greece’s prayer practice passed constitu-
tional muster. But the Court was nonetheless fractured: the case 
generated five opinions, and a majority failed to coalesce around 
a shared rationale on one key legal issue. Justice Kennedy wrote 
the opinion of the Court on the first two questions, holding that 
openly sectarian legislative prayer is constitutionally acceptable 
and that, despite the imbalance in religious groups invited to lead 
prayers, the selection process for prayer givers was neutral and 
thus constitutional. While a majority of the Court found that the 
practice was not coercive, they fractured on the rationale.126 
Justice Elena Kagan wrote the primary dissent, joined by 
the remaining justices, which argued that the prayers should 
have been nonsectarian and that Greece should have solicited 
prayers from more diverse clergy.127 The dissent also argued that 
the location of a local government meeting is more coercive than 
the legislative session at issue in Marsh.128 Justice Breyer dis-
sented separately to explain all of the practical ways that Greece 
 
 124 See Town of Greece, 572 US at 585. 
 125 See id at 585–86. 
 126 This Comment treats Justice Kennedy’s opinion as controlling. See, for example, 
Lund, 863 F3d at 277 (en banc) (treating Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion as control-
ling without further discussion); Lund, 837 F3d at 416–17 (panel opinion) (same). See 
also Bormuth, 870 F3d at 515 n 10 (implying that a majority of the en banc Sixth Circuit 
agrees that Justice Kennedy’s opinion controls). There are, however, some who believe 
that, under Marks, Justice Thomas’s concurrence should control on this final legal ques-
tion. See, for example, Bormuth, 870 F3d at 515 n 10. It is outside the scope of this 
Comment to fully grapple with this question, but there are very strong arguments that, 
as a matter of logic and Marks itself, Justice Kennedy’s opinion is the one that binds 
lower courts. See, for example, Bormuth, 870 F3d at 519–21 (Rogers concurring). Moreo-
ver, applying Justice Thomas’s proposed test would upend binding Supreme Court prec-
edent, whereas Justice Kennedy’s acknowledgment of indirect coercion would not. See 
Bormuth, 870 F3d at 540 n 9 (Moore dissenting). 
 127 See Town of Greece, 572 US at 631–32 (Kagan dissenting). 
 128 See id at 626–27 (Kagan dissenting). 
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could have made its prayer practice more inclusive and, by his 
lights, constitutional.129 
A majority of the Court quickly rejected the plaintiffs’ first 
two arguments. In response to the first, regarding sectarian 
prayer, it noted that, in the actual Marsh case, many of the 
prayers were overtly Christian.130 Moreover, requiring that the 
prayer be nonsectarian would require the town and judiciary to 
actively police the content of the prayer.131 But the Court explic-
itly withheld judgment on a hypothetical future case in which 
“the invocations denigrate nonbelievers or religious minorities, 
threaten damnation, or preach conversion.”132 
Second, a majority of the Court held that the method of iden-
tifying prayer givers did not violate governmental neutrality. The 
Court explained that the method was neutral and reasonable: 
“So long as the town maintains a policy of nondiscrimination, the 
Constitution does not require it to search beyond its borders for 
non-Christian prayer givers in an effort to achieve religious bal-
ancing.”133 In his concurrence, Justice Samuel Alito elaborated 
that the method of identifying prayer givers was appropriate in 
two respects: first, the policy was not born of “religious animus,” 
and second, the town offered opportunities to non-Christians to 
lead prayers once the lack of diversity was brought to their atten-
tion.134 In essence, the procedure for selecting prayer givers was 
facially neutral, which is all that the Constitution requires.135 A 
majority of the court also found that Greece’s prayer practice, 
though implemented only in the 1990s, was justifiable due to its 
 
 129 See id at 612–14 (Breyer dissenting). 
 130 See id at 580–81 (Kennedy) (plurality). 
 131 See Town of Greece, 572 US at 580–81; id at 595 (Alito concurring). While the 
majority and concurring opinions do not cite the Lemon test, they do seem concerned 
with potential religious entanglements. See Lemon, 403 US at 620–21 (prohibiting moni-
toring practices that “entangle” the state with religious practice). Justice Kagan coun-
tered that, in Marsh, the prayer giver stopped giving sectarian prayers when asked, and 
“the Court would have reached a different decision” in that case if the prayers had been 
given to “advance any one . . . faith.” Town of Greece, 572 US at 627 (Kagan dissenting). 
 132 Town of Greece, 572 US at 583. 
 133 Id at 567. 
 134 Id at 593–94 (Alito concurring). 
 135 Writing in dissent, Justice Kagan argued that, regardless of the methods used to 
identify prayer givers, “prayer repeatedly invoking a single religion’s beliefs . . . crossed a 
constitutional line.” Id at 618 (Kagan dissenting). Also, note the contrast between Justice 
Alito’s reasoning and Santa Fe, which condemned a facially neutral method of selecting a 
prayer giver because of concerns over majoritarianism. See Santa Fe, 530 US at 311, 316–
17. See also Part III.B below (distinguishing Town of Greece and Santa Fe because, in the 
former, the facially neutral process does not directly rely on majoritarian decision-making). 
162 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:151 
 
similarity to other accepted policies.136 The Court echoed Marsh’s 
reasoning that practices adopted by the First Congress, such as 
sectarian prayer, are presumptively constitutional.137 A majority of 
the Court also found that there is a historical precedent for prayer 
in small-town board meetings.138 Thus, the practice’s historical 
pedigree shielded it from the exacting constitutional scrutiny 
embodied in traditional Establishment Clause tests such as 
Lemon.139 
The majority hints, however, that historical pedigree may 
be qualified by other Establishment Clause tests: “Any test the 
Court adopts must acknowledge a practice that was accepted by 
the Framers and has withstood the critical scrutiny of time and 
political change.”140 In other words, the Court acknowledges that 
historicity is not the be-all and end-all of legislative prayer and 
that other Establishment Clause tests may be appropriate. In-
deed, the controlling plurality opinion went on to analyze 
Greece’s prayer practice in light of the coercion test, suggesting 
that, while historicity is important to the Court’s analysis, it is 
not necessarily sufficient to find instances of legislative prayer 
constitutional.141 
This final issue facing the Court—whether the practice of 
sectarian prayer (offered by a third party) at a local government 
meeting was coercive to citizens in attendance—proved more 
controversial, with no opinion commanding a majority of the 
Court. The controlling opinion, written by Justice Kennedy,142 
employed a broad indirect coercion analysis of the town’s prayer 
practice.143 Justice Thomas agreed, on other grounds, that the 
prayers were constitutional, thus supplying a majority.144 
 
 136 But see Fallon, 128 Harv L Rev at 431 (cited in note 57). 
 137 Town of Greece, 572 US at 575–79. 
 138 Id at 576. 
 139 See Lisa Shaw Roy, The Unexplored Implications of Town of Greece v. Galloway, 
80 Albany L Rev 877, 879–80 (2016) (collecting scholarly reactions and discussing the 
history argument). 
 140 Town of Greece, 572 US at 577. 
 141 Id at 584–92. 
 142 See note 126 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of why this Comment 
treats this opinion as controlling. 
 143 See Town of Greece, 572 US at 584–92. 
 144 Id at 608–10 (Thomas concurring) (arguing that the only valid form of a coercion 
test is examining whether anybody was directly and legally coerced by the government). 
Justice Kagan dissented, contending that the intimate environs of a local government 
meeting were dissimilar from a legislative session in a capitol building and more likely 
to lead to indirect coercion to participate. Id at 625–31 (Kagan dissenting). 
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Justice Kennedy, in the plurality opinion, explained that, 
because the prayers were not directed at the non-
councilmembers, they cannot be coercive. Quoting the district 
court in Marsh, Justice Kennedy explained that legislative prayer 
as an “internal act” is permissible under the Establishment 
Clause.145 In this context, “internal” means primarily for an au-
dience of other legislators.146 Since the prayers in Greece were 
also “internal” in the sense that they were primarily to “accom-
modate the spiritual needs of lawmakers and connect them to a 
tradition dating to the time of the Framers,” they thus fell into 
the set of practices recognized and allowed in Marsh.147 Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion distinguished this case from Weisman and 
Santa Fe by noting that any offended person in attendance could 
simply leave for the prayer and return to the board meeting once 
the prayer concluded.148 Whereas the students in Weisman and 
Santa Fe were arguably required to attend and their behavior 
may have been monitored, here the meeting’s attendees were 
adults who were not required to participate in or even attend a 
prayer that offended their religious sensibilities.149 This plurality 
opinion, however, explicitly withheld judgment on several factual 
wrinkles not presented, noting that, despite the holding in Town 
of Greece, “[t]he inquiry remains a fact-sensitive one that con-
siders both the setting in which the prayer arises and the audi-
ence to whom it is directed.”150 Most importantly, the Court did 
not address a situation in which “town board members directed 
the public to participate in the prayers, singled out dissidents for 
opprobrium, or indicated that their decisions might be influenced 
 
 145 Id at 587 (Kennedy) (plurality), quoting Chambers, 504 F Supp at 588. 
 146 See Town of Greece, 572 US at 588. 
 147 Id. 
 148 See id at 590 (“Nothing in the record suggests that members of the public are 
dissuaded from leaving the meeting room during the prayer, arriving late, or even, as 
happened here, making a later protest.”). See also id at 594 (Alito concurring):  
The prayer preceded only the portion of the town board meeting that I view as 
essentially legislative. While it is true that the matters considered by the board 
during this initial part of the meeting might involve very specific questions, 
such as the installation of a traffic light or stop sign at a particular intersec-
tion, that does not transform the nature of this part of the meeting. 
 149 See id at 590–91. The various opinions, including the dissents, also do not ad-
dress the possibility that religious minorities may feel coerced to participate, not because 
they feel uncomfortable individually but because they worry about how the incident may 
lead to a backlash against all members of that minority group. 
 150 Town of Greece, 572 US at 587. 
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by a person’s acquiescence in the prayer opportunity.”151 Similarly, 
the plurality implied that prayer that “chastised dissenters [or] 
attempted lengthy disquisition on religious dogma” would be 
impermissible.152 As the Fourth Circuit later noted in Lund, 
“[T]he decision takes for granted the use of outside clergy.”153 
The holding of Town of Greece, that inoffensive sectarian 
prayers offered by third parties are constitutional, supports the 
view that the Court’s prayer and coercion jurisprudence is dom-
inated by prophylactic rules. In Marsh, the Court established 
that legislative prayer is generally constitutional so long as it 
hews relatively closely to what was practiced at the Founding. 
The holding in Town of Greece can therefore be understood as a 
prophylactic rule in reverse—allowing a practice that may vio-
late the “real” Constitution in order to prevent judges from hav-
ing to parse the theological significance and coercive potential of 
every meditation offered by a third party.154 Thus, the plaintiffs’ 
desired solution of examining prayer content and allowing only 
nonsectarian prayers is actually at odds with the spirit of 
Weisman and Santa Fe. Although the Court said in dicta that 
the coercion inquiry for legislative prayer is fact-sensitive, the 
controlling opinion nonetheless also establishes a strong pre-
sumption that, when a third party is giving prayers, the pray-
ers are constitutional.155 
The holding in Town of Greece therefore aligns with the other 
government prayer decisions. As in Santa Fe and Weisman, the 
controlling opinion in Town of Greece does not meaningfully ad-
dress whether someone actually felt coerced to participate; the 
discussion was conclusory and theoretical.156 The Court rests its 
conclusion on the observation that adults are generally hearty 
enough that they can withstand peer pressure and a subtly offen-
sive environment engendered by the legislators’ presence.157 Thus, 
 
 151 Id at 588. 
 152 Id at 589–90. 
 153 Lund, 863 F3d at 278. 
 154 See Strauss, 55 U Chi L Rev at 206–07 (cited in note 66) (explaining how Oregon 
v Mitchell, 400 US 112 (1970), provides an example of a prophylactic rule operating in 
reverse). 
 155 See Town of Greece, 572 US at 589–90. 
 156 See id at 590–91 (dismissing the plaintiffs’ objections to the practice because they 
could not point to specific instances of coercion—despite the fact that the Court found 
coercion present on even sparser records in Weisman and Santa Fe). 
 157 Id at 589 (“Offense . . . does not equate to coercion. Adults often encounter speech 
they find disagreeable; and an Establishment Clause violation is not made out any time 
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someone might actually feel coerced but be unable to overcome 
the presumption so long as the legislators or third-party prayer 
givers do not engage in a pattern of overt coercion. But if the 
Court is to protect the holding in Marsh and prevent extended 
and potentially error-prone judicial review, minor constitutional 
violations, such as an adult feeling pressure to participate in a 
prayer, may be tolerated.158 Whereas in Santa Fe and Weisman, 
the Court arguably held practices that did not violate the “real” 
Constitution unconstitutional, here the Court did the opposite, 
allowing a practice that may actually be indirectly coercive. 
C. Circuit Split regarding Sectarian Prayer Delivered by Local 
Government Representatives 
The Town of Greece decision in many ways created more 
questions than it answered. In particular, the plurality opinion’s 
insistence that the inquiry is “fact sensitive” and that its holding 
should not be read to extend to other factual circumstances left 
lower courts wondering which circumstances are permissible 
and which are not.159 Town of Greece also failed to answer what 
constitutional tests courts should employ. Beyond mentioning 
that these situations exist, Town of Greece provided lower courts 
with few tools for responding to new fact patterns.160 
The circuit split between the Fourth and Sixth Circuits re-
garding prayer led by local government representatives them-
selves highlights this lacuna. In Lund, the Fourth Circuit held 
that one county’s practice of legislator-led prayer violated the 
Establishment Clause,161 but in Bormuth, the Sixth Circuit 
found a generally similar practice to be constitutional.162 These 
two cases resulted in a flurry of opinions; the majorities in each 
circuit understood the holding of Town of Greece differently, and 
the two circuits came to opposite conclusions despite confronting 
similar factual circumstances.163 On the one hand, the Fourth 
 
a person experiences a sense of affront from the expression of contrary religious views in 
a legislative forum.”). 
 158 See Strauss, 55 U Chi L Rev at 205–07 (cited in note 66). 
 159 Town of Greece, 572 US at 587. 
 160 See note 132 and accompanying text. 
 161 See Lund, 863 F3d at 290. 
 162 See Bormuth, 870 F3d at 498. 
 163 But see id at 512–13, 518 (distinguishing the factual circumstances in the two 
cases as a possible explanation for the distinct results). Though the content of the pray-
ers on the record necessarily differs, that is insufficient grounds for distinguishing the 
cases. As Parts II.C.1–2 discuss in greater detail, the two courts read Town of Greece 
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Circuit considered several factors mentioned by the Town of 
Greece opinion to fashion a new totality of the circumstances 
standard that generally disfavors sectarian prayers led by coun-
cilmembers, regardless of whether or not participants actually 
felt coerced. On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit held that the 
legal test from Town of Greece fully controls instances of prayer 
led by councilmembers. Moreover, in order to show that a prac-
tice is unconstitutionally coercive, plaintiffs must demonstrate 
that the councilmembers engaged in retaliatory behavior. 
1. Fourth Circuit: totality of the circumstances test 
through the lens of the prayer giver’s identity. 
In Lund, the Rowan County, North Carolina Board deliv-
ered invocations before their meetings for years and did not al-
low others to deliver an invocation.164 The prayers in question 
were “pointedly sectarian” in that they exclusively referenced the 
Christian faith, and some of the prayers “veered from time to 
time into overt proselytization.”165 Some of the prayers included 
requests for attendees to join in, and the setting was akin to 
that of Town of Greece rather than Marsh in that it was a meet-
ing of local government, not the state legislature in the state 
capitol.166 
The Fourth Circuit’s en banc opinion considered instances of 
legislator-led prayer to be broadly governed by the holding and 
tests in Town of Greece. It noted that, per Town of Greece, a 
court determining the constitutionality of a prayer practice 
“must conduct a ‘fact-sensitive’ review of ‘the setting in which 
the prayer arises and the audience to whom it is directed’” ra-
ther than applying another Establishment Clause test such as 
Lemon.167 Moreover, it applied dicta from Town of Greece, which 
explained that a few stray prayers that denigrate religious mi-
norities or nonbelievers do “not despoil a practice that on the 
whole reflects and embraces our tradition. Absent a pattern of 
 
very differently and applied different legal tests. Moreover, there is reason to think that 
the practices and religious content of the two counties’ prayers were not so dissimilar. 
See Bormuth, 870 F3d at 525–26 (Moore dissenting). Finally, as discussed below, this 
Comment argues that neither circuit’s approach is especially workable or consistent with 
the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 
 164 See Lund, 863 F3d at 272. 
 165 Id. Though the board members were all Protestant Christians, they were not all 
of the same denomination. Id at 282. 
 166 Id at 272. 
 167 Id at 281, quoting Town of Greece, 572 US at 587. 
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prayers that over time denigrate, proselytize, or betray an im-
permissible government purpose, a challenge based solely on 
the content of a prayer will not likely establish a constitutional 
violation.”168 
The court converted these instructions to a totality of the 
circumstances test centered on the practice of the county board. 
Specifically, it examined four aspects of the prayers in turn and 
together: (1) “commissioners as the sole prayer-givers,” 
(2) “invocations that drew exclusively on Christianity and some-
times served to advance that faith,” (3) “invitations to attendees 
to participate,” and (4) “the local government setting.”169 
With respect to items (2)–(4), the Fourth Circuit found it 
particularly important that the prayer givers were exclusively 
board members.170 It is worth noting that these latter three fac-
tors were also present in Town of Greece: until the litigation be-
gan, the prayers in Greece were exclusively Christian, the prayer 
givers often invited those in attendance to participate, and the 
town meetings were intimate local government meetings.171 The 
Lund court then held that “it is the combination of these ele-
ments—not any particular feature alone—that” violated the Es-
tablishment Clause.172 
The Lund court first distinguished Town of Greece, in which 
there was a facially neutral and open prayer-giving policy. Ulti-
mately, a Wiccan priestess (among others) requested to give a 
prayer and was afforded the opportunity to do so.173 In Lund, in 
contrast, the board members refused to give any third parties 
the opportunity to give prayers at the beginning of the meeting.174 
This, the court held, thus contravenes the Town of Greece justifi-
cation for the prayer practice—that it was open to majority and 
minority religions alike (and was thus neutral).175 
Here, the court also discussed the applicability of the third 
Lemon prong: that the prayer practice should not foster “political 
 
 168 Town of Greece, 572 US at 585. See also Lund, 863 F3d at 283, quoting Town of 
Greece, 572 US at 585. 
 169 Lund, 863 F3d at 281. 
 170 Id. 
 171 See Town of Greece, 572 US at 578–79. 
 172 Lund, 863 F3d at 281. 
 173 See Town of Greece, 572 US at 572. 
 174 See Lund, 863 F3d at 282. 
 175 See Town of Greece, 572 US at 585–86 (“So long as the town maintains a policy of 
nondiscrimination, the Constitution does not require it to search beyond its borders for 
non-Christian prayer givers in an effort to achieve religious balancing.”). 
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division.”176 Without discussing Santa Fe, Lund noted that the 
prayer practice became a controversial topic at the 2016 board 
elections, and one person who “‘expressed opposition to the 
Board’s prayer practice’ was booed and jeered by the audience” 
of other community members.177 Though the threads of these ar-
guments are not altogether lucid in the en banc opinion, the 
thrust appears to be that having sectarian prayer given exclu-
sively by the councilmembers violates both the neutrality prin-
ciple from Town of Greece and the political divisiveness principle 
from Lemon.178 
The Lund opinion then examined three factors from Town of 
Greece in light of the fact that the legislators themselves were 
leading the prayers. First, in Town of Greece, the controlling 
opinion instructed, “[A]dult citizens . . . can tolerate and perhaps 
appreciate a ceremonial prayer delivered by a person of a differ-
ent faith” and thus allowed sectarian prayer delivered by third 
parties that is not belligerent.179 In viewing the prayer content 
through the lens of the prayer givers’ status as government rep-
resentatives, the Lund court looked at similar prayer content 
and found the prayers problematic. Specifically, the prayers at 
issue in Lund were also almost exclusively Christian and were 
occasionally confrontational to non-Christians.180 The Lund 
court first suggested that the prayers at issue were more con-
frontational than those in Town of Greece181 then noted that, 
when recited by agents of the government, the sectarian nature 
of the prayers becomes a potential establishment of religion.182 
Next, the Lund court focused on the distinction from Town 
of Greece that noted that invitations to participate in prayers 
from the legislators themselves are expressly not protected by 
the Town of Greece opinion.183 The Lund court first looked at 
 
 176 See Lund, 863 F3d at 282. 
 177 Id. 
 178 The opinion also does not explain why the prayer practice in Town of Greece did 
not fail the Lemon test given that it too sowed political discord. See Town of Greece, 572 
US at 614–15 (Breyer dissenting); id at 636 (Kagan dissenting). 
 179 Id at 584 (Kennedy) (plurality). 
 180 See Lund, 863 F3d at 284–86 (quoting prayers, for example: “[W]e do believe that 
there is only one way to salvation, and that is Jesus Christ”; “We can’t be defeated, we 
can’t be destroyed, and we won’t be denied, because of our salvation through the Lord 
Jesus Christ”). 
 181 See id. But see id at 314 (Agee dissenting) (noting that many of the prayers in 
Town of Greece are similar to those criticized in the majority opinion). 
 182 See id at 286. 
 183 See id at 286–87. 
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whom the calls were directed toward—the other councilmembers 
or the citizens in attendance.184 Looking at the record, it found 
that the calls were often directed to those in attendance, mean-
ing that government agents exhorted not just themselves but 
others to participate in sectarian prayer.185 The Lund majority 
also remarked offhandedly that this issue on its own may be 
dispositive in favor of those challenging the prayer practice.186 
Finally, whereas the prayers in both Town of Greece and 
Lund took place in local government meetings, the Lund court 
distinguished the practices at two levels. First, it noted that, 
when prayer givers are the councilmembers themselves, leaving 
the meeting for the duration of the prayer does more to margin-
alize the dissident.187 It is not clear from the opinion, however, 
what exactly the mechanism of marginalization is and whether 
it would have been present in Town of Greece as well. Second, 
Lund distinguishes the facts of Town of Greece, noting that in 
the latter there was a clearer separation between prayer and 
lawmaking, making it easier for objectors to leave without the 
council immediately making decisions about various petitioners 
as soon as the prayers concluded.188 The Lund majority opinion 
then concluded that legislative prayer, as practiced in Rowan 
County, violated the Establishment Clause.189 
2. Sixth Circuit: elevating history and downplaying the 
prayer giver’s position. 
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit found that a practice similar 
to that discussed above was constitutional.190 As in Lund, 
Jackson County commissioners delivered prayers on a rotating 
basis, prayers were exclusively Christian, and the commission-
ers often instructed citizens in attendance to participate.191 In 
Bormuth, some of the councilmembers were openly antagonistic 
 
 184 See Lund, 863 F3d at 287. 
 185 See id. 
 186 Id at 277, quoting Town of Greece, 572 US at 588 (“[T]he analysis would be dif-
ferent if town board members directed the public to participate in the prayers.”) (empha-
sis added). 
 187 See Lund, 863 F3d at 288. 
 188 See id. See also Town of Greece, 572 US at 593–94 (Alito concurring). 
 189 Lund, 863 F3d at 290–91. 
 190 See Bormuth, 870 F3d at 498. 
 191 See id at 498–99. 
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to a person who complained about the practice, though there 
may have been alternative justifications for their disfavor.192 
The Sixth Circuit applied a different legal standard than 
the Fourth Circuit to arrive at its alternate conclusion: it placed 
great weight on the historical pedigree of legislative prayer gen-
erally193 and then considered whether the situations described in 
Town of Greece differed in other ways beyond the identity of the 
prayer giver.194 
Specifically, the Sixth Circuit applied the coercion test with 
regard to three facts in the record: the councilmembers requested 
audience participation, the councilmembers turned their backs 
on Mr. Bormuth during the hearings, and the council declined to 
appoint Mr. Bormuth to various citizens’ boards.195 As in Lund, 
the Bormuth majority used Town of Greece as its starting point 
but read the decision to broadly license all forms of legislative 
prayer. The primary frame of its analysis was not the distinction 
between councilmembers and local pastors (as in Lund) but ra-
ther the historical pedigree of legislative prayer generally.196 
First, the Bormuth court disregarded Town of Greece’s dicta 
regarding the differences between requests to participate coming 
from clergy and councilmembers: “We do not think there is a 
constitutional difference here, for government-sanctioned pray-
ers by official chaplains or invited community members still fall 
within the ambit of the Establishment Clause.”197 It explained 
Town of Greece’s distinction by hypothesizing that Town of 
Greece contemplated individualized commands for objectors to 
participate.198 
Second, the Bormuth court observed that, though some 
councilmembers criticized Mr. Bormuth and turned their backs 
on him, they may not have done so because of his criticism of 
 
 192 See id at 517–18. 
 193 See id at 504. 
 194 See Bormuth, 870 F3d at 512. 
 195 See id at 517. 
 196 See id at 510 (criticizing the opinion in Lund because it did not account for his-
torical instances of legislator-led prayer). 
 197 Id at 517. 
 198 The majority approvingly cited a district court opinion that found an Establishment 
Clause violation when councilmembers ordered the forcible ejection of people who re-
spectfully refused to participate in a premeeting prayer. See id, citing Fields v Speaker of 
the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, 251 F Supp 3d 772, 776, 788 (MD Pa 2017). The 
opinion does not, however, describe how forcible ejection differs from Justice Thomas’s 
higher direct coercion bar. See note 63. Bormuth also did not discuss Weisman and Santa 
Fe despite the fact that they are part of the Court’s coercion jurisprudence. 
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their prayers. Rather, Mr. Bormuth was confrontational with 
the councilmembers, both about the prayer practice and other 
issues in front of the council.199 Regardless, the Bormuth court 
reasoned, a few statements and actions do not make a pattern so 
as to run afoul of Town of Greece.200 
Finally, the Bormuth court placed the burden of proving co-
ercion on Mr. Bormuth. Thus, Town of Greece explained that leg-
islative prayer’s historical pedigree will generally insulate it 
from thinly supported allegations of indirect coercion. Although 
the Bormuth court acknowledged that the councilmembers dis-
liked Mr. Bormuth’s complaints about the prayers, it concluded, 
“Bormuth failed to put forth any evidence tying his objection to 
the invocations to the Board’s decision to not appoint him to the 
[requested committee], and [it] therefore g[a]ve no weight to this 
allegation.”201 
* * * 
The Sixth Circuit’s opinion recast Town of Greece as a broad 
opinion with applicability across myriad contexts. While deter-
minations about legislative prayer remain fact-sensitive pro-
cesses, there is a strong presumption of constitutionality so long 
as the practice is generally tied to the historical roots of legisla-
tive prayer.202 This approach ignores the dicta in the Town of 
Greece plurality opinion itself that specifically limited the hold-
ing of the case. Finally, in order to prevail on a coercion claim, a 
plaintiff must show that the legislators took specific retaliatory 
action, unlike in Weisman or Santa Fe, in which indirect coer-
cion could be presumed from the circumstances. 
In contrast, Lund established a fact-intensive totality of the 
circumstances test that relies heavily on the dicta in Town of 
Greece.203 The court emphasized the inherent divisiveness in 
having prayers offered by elected representatives and the fact 
that elevating a single religion in the public sphere amounts to 
 
 199 Bormuth, 870 F3d at 517–18. 
 200 Id at 518. 
 201 Id at 519. 
 202 The opinion also suggested that discriminatory procedures for selecting prayer 
givers would violate the Constitution as well. See id at 514 (citing Lund and suggesting 
that the constitutional minimum for neutrality is nondiscrimination). 
 203 See Lund, 863 F3d at 281. It is worth noting that Bormuth also attempted to dis-
tinguish Lund on the facts, describing the prayers in Lund as more sectarian and con-
frontational. Bormuth, 870 F3d at 512–13, 518. Regardless, the two opinions use very 
different reasoning and announce quite dissimilar tests. 
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endorsement.204 This dynamic changes the historically sanctioned 
practice described in Town of Greece into something that invites 
greater inquiry.205 As such, Lund hints at the possibility that 
having government prayer givers brings the practice of legisla-
tive prayer closer to the ambit of traditional Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence.206 
III.  RETHINKING COERCION AND FACT-SPECIFIC INQUIRIES 
This Part argues that both circuits’ approaches to this issue 
are unworkable or at odds with Supreme Court precedent. The 
Sixth Circuit established a fairly simple bright-line rule to de-
termine whether a practice is coercive: there must be a pattern 
of singling out or openly punishing dissidents. The problem 
with this approach is that it ignores much of the plurality opin-
ion in Town of Greece and sweeps aside other parts of the 
Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Specifically, it 
does not grapple with the ways in which sectarian prayer led by 
councilmembers may be categorically more divisive or coercive 
than those led by a local religious leader or other disinterested 
third party—facts that Town of Greece seems to contemplate.207 
The Fourth Circuit’s test suffers from a more fundamental 
fault: it is almost impossible to apply.208 The Fourth Circuit calls 
for weighing and reweighing almost every factor discussed and 
disposed with in Town of Greece. At the very least, Town of 
Greece established a presumption of constitutionality in the 
mine-run case in which the legislators themselves did not get 
involved. Lund’s analysis, however, is not pellucid and seems to 
apply to only the set of facts presented in the case. Requiring en 
banc review for any prayer or combination of prayers would de-
feat a central theme that animated the Town of Greece majority: 
 
 204 For divisiveness, see Lund, 863 F3d at 275, quoting Lemon, 403 US at 622. For 
endorsement and neutrality, see Lund, 863 F3d at 280, quoting Larson v Valente, 456 
US 228, 244 (1982) (“[T]he clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one 
religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”). 
 205 See Lund, 863 F3d at 280. 
 206 Part III.B discusses this possibility further. 
 207 See Town of Greece, 572 US at 588–89. 
 208 See Paris Adult Theatre I v Slaton, 413 US 49, 83–94 (1973) (Brennan dissent-
ing) (explaining that, when the majority of the Court fails to announce a simple legal 
rule in such fact-sensitive circumstances, it can lead to confusion, chilling of constitu-
tional behavior, and unnecessary appeals). 
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that governments and courts should, by and large, steer away 
from policing the specifics of legislative prayer.209 
This Part suggests a solution to this split that alleviates 
many of these problems. First, this Part extends the insight that 
the Court seeks to prevent fact-specific reviews by fully fleshing 
out the structure of constitutional prophylactic rules in legisla-
tive prayer.210 Thinking about the Court’s prayer cases as over-
lapping prophylactic rules then leads to the obvious question of 
where the borderline cases of legislator-led prayer fit in. The 
Sixth Circuit held that they should be treated identically to Town 
of Greece and that there should be a strong presumption of their 
constitutionality.211 But the opinion in Bormuth did not consider 
whether another prophylactic rule would be appropriate. 
The correct prophylactic rule should be that legislative 
prayer led predominantly by councilmembers in these intimate 
environs is unconstitutional. Town of Greece accepted that pray-
ers led by councilmembers themselves are distinguishable from 
the practice deemed constitutional in that case.212 And in Santa 
Fe, the Court recognized that mingling majoritarian decision-
making with prayer creates a divisive political potential, thus 
violating the Lemon test.213 Moreover, this is a practical solution 
that balances two conflicting strains in Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence. While legislative prayer offered by third parties 
was declared presumptively constitutional in Town of Greece, 
the Court is also skeptical of practices that enmesh majoritarian 
decision-making with religious establishments.214 
A. Limitations of the Extant Circuit Opinions 
As discussed above, the Court’s government prayer cases 
bear the hallmarks of constitutional prophylactic rules.215 The 
Court is, on the one hand, willing to apply very strong medicine to 
prevent even ecumenical or nonsectarian prayers from being ut-
tered with the government’s imprimatur in the presence of teen-
agers. But on the other hand, it employs a reverse prophylactic 
 
 209 Town of Greece, 572 US at 579–82. 
 210 See generally Strauss, 55 U Chi L Rev at 190 (cited in note 66). 
 211 See Bormuth, 870 F3d at 509–14, 519. 
 212 See Lund, 863 F3d at 278. 
 213 Santa Fe, 530 US at 310–11. 
 214 See notes 74–75 and accompanying text (discussing other areas of First Amendment 
law in which the Court is skeptical of majoritarian decision-making). 
 215 See Part I.B. 
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rule with regard to third-party delivered prayers at constituent-
facing government functions. In this context, the Court is willing 
to countenance far more sectarian prayers so long as the prayers 
are not outrageous and the custom is arguably similar to that 
practiced by the First Congress. 
Neither of the circuits that have reviewed the constitution-
ality of legislator-led prayer has grappled with the tension be-
tween these strains in the Court’s prayer jurisprudence, or the 
fact that they appear to be strong prophylactic rules operating in 
tension. Their analyses are therefore unsatisfactory because the 
opinions do not recognize that this area of the law is structured to 
prevent extended factual reviews and may turn on seemingly mi-
nute details. 
The Fourth Circuit’s approach in Lund therefore violates 
the tenor of the Court’s prayer jurisprudence. It requires trial 
courts to laboriously consider the evidence before them about 
the denominational breakdown of the prayers as a whole, how 
exhortative each prayer was, and whether councilmembers in-
vited citizen attendees to participate.216 In its application, the 
court had to determine whether “the invocations crossed the line 
from ‘reflect[ing] upon shared ideals and common ends,’ . . . to 
‘promot[ing] a preferred system of belief.’”217 This is a subjective 
inquiry that relies on extensive judicial factfinding, not just into 
the words of the prayers but also into how those words were de-
livered and received by those in attendance.218 
The totality of the circumstances test announced in Lund 
will prove unworkable.219 While it cites dicta in Town of Greece 
to elucidate what factors reviewing courts are supposed to use to 
analyze the constitutionality of prayers,220 it takes that dicta too 
much at face value. Here, weighing those factors without any 
presumption one way or the other because the prayer givers are 
 
 216 See Lund, 863 F3d at 281. 
 217 Id at 284, quoting Town of Greece, 572 US at 581, 583. 
 218 See Town of Greece, 572 US at 589–90 (discussing how to discern between “in-
ternal” and “external” prayers). See also Lund, 863 F3d at 282–86 (discussing how the 
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legislative actors requires courts to make difficult judgment 
calls based on hard-to-discern facts. Moreover, the Court’s guid-
ance about what types of prayers are acceptable is inconsistent 
and thus cannot provide meaningful instruction to lower courts 
if they seek to weigh multiple factors.221 For example, at what 
point do children’s presence turn an acceptable legislative prayer 
into something unacceptable?222 Similarly, Town of Greece in-
structs that isolated incidents of proselytization are tolerable, 
but where should lower courts draw the line—while also factor-
ing in the agenda of the meeting, identity of the prayer giver, 
wording of the invitations to participate, and any other myriad 
factual details mentioned in passing in various cases?223 
Although the Sixth Circuit recognizes that Town of Greece 
created a presumption of constitutionality with third-party leg-
islative prayer, it fails to situate the opinion in the broader 
Establishment Clause context. Weisman and Santa Fe show that 
in generally similar circumstances, some factual tweaks, such as 
the presence of children for school-related reasons, can lead to a 
broad preclusive rule against prayers’ constitutionality.224 At the 
very least, this hair-trigger quality requires courts to be atten-
tive to potentially distinguishing details. Moreover, Town of 
Greece invites lower courts to limit the case to its facts by specifi-
cally describing the holding as narrow with regard to the prayer 
practice in that town.225 The Court also invited lower courts to re-
consider the applicability of the Town of Greece opinion in dissim-
ilar situations (but did not tell them how to weigh any of the men-
tioned factors).226 
There are also practical reasons to suspect that the Court 
does not intend for Town of Greece to be read broadly. In the 
 
 221 See notes 150–56 and accompanying text (describing the caveats in the plurality 
opinion in Town of Greece). 
 222 Compare Town of Greece, 572 US at 597–98 (Alito concurring), 623–28 (Kagan 
dissenting), with Weisman, 505 US at 592–93. See also Bormuth, 870 F3d at 501–02 
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term following Town of Greece, it denied certiorari, over a dis-
sent from Justice Scalia, in a case that could have extended 
Town of Greece’s presumption against coercion to another public 
high school graduation ceremony that took place in a church but 
had no prayer content.227 Similarly, the Court recently denied 
certiorari in Lund over an ardent dissent by Justice Thomas.228 
Though too much should not be made of the denials of certiorari, 
both instances taken together show, at the very least, that the 
Sixth Circuit’s capacious reading of Town of Greece is not obvi-
ously correct—had the Court intended to simply extend Town of 
Greece to these types of cases, it could have issued a per curiam 
opinion to that effect. 
One obvious counterargument against attempts to distin-
guish Town of Greece from legislator-led prayer is that it cre-
ates an arbitrary and unnecessary discontinuity in the law. For 
example, in a concurrence to the Bormuth en banc opinion, 
Judge Jeffrey Sutton argued that it would be silly to say that, if 
a hired third party had given identical prayers, the practice 
would pass constitutional muster.229 Such a minor difference 
seems arbitrary and therefore is not enough to distinguish the 
case of legislator-led prayer from that offered by a third party.230 
This argument, however, ignores the fact that the Court’s hold-
ings on the Establishment Clause, and government prayer in 
particular, are already rife with remarkably similar-seeming in-
consistencies. For example, one barely religious prayer delivered 
by a rabbi was coercive in Weisman, but a decade’s worth of ex-
clusively Christian prayers at government functions at which 
children were also present and at which legislators made adju-
dications affecting meeting participants was not coercive in 
Town of Greece. This is the result of two overlapping prophylac-
tic rules, which lead to the same kind of inconsistencies Judge 
Sutton argues would be out of place in constitutional law. 
 
 227 See generally Elmbrook School District v Doe, 572 US 2283 (2014) (Scalia dissent-
ing from denial of certiorari) (arguing that Town of Greece changed the Establishment 
Clause landscape and that lower court decisions issued before it should be revisited). 
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 229 See Bormuth, 870 F3d at 523 (Sutton concurring).  See also Lund, 138 S Ct at 
2566 (Thomas dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
 230 See Bormuth, 870 F3d at 523 (Sutton concurring). 
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This Comment’s approach is to recognize that these incon-
sistencies are actually foundational to the Court’s prayer juris-
prudence and to place legislator-led prayer within this broader 
context. Moreover, the facts of Bormuth illustrate the limita-
tions of Judge Sutton’s approach. The councilmembers became 
offended when the plaintiff criticized their prayers and may 
have retaliated against him.231 The possibility of offense and re-
taliation are greatly heightened when the elected officials have a 
personal stake in the prayers—that is, when they are them-
selves delivering prayers.232 Finally, as illustrated by Professor 
Strauss’s freedom of speech example, legislators may use pre-
texts to hide their unconstitutional animus.233 
It would accord more with the government-prayer jurispru-
dence to take the decision-making about prayer content and 
meeting context out of the hands of judges and apply a bright-
line rule against legislator-led prayer.234 But this then leads to 
the obvious question of whether the Town of Greece presumption 
of constitutionality should apply in cases in which the legislators 
themselves are the exclusive prayer givers. The Sixth Circuit 
assumed it did in Bormuth, but the controlling opinion in Town 
of Greece reserved judgment on the question.235 As the next Sec-
tion discusses, a concurrent line of precedent about intermingling 
religion and political processes leading to divisiveness indicates 
that the practice of legislator-led prayer in intimate local-
government settings is a per se violation of the Establishment 
Clause. 
B. Legislator-Led Prayer Entangles Religion in Political 
Processes and Is Politically Divisive, Thereby Violating the 
Establishment Clause 
Marsh and Town of Greece establish an exception to the 
Court’s general Establishment Clause principles because of the 
historical pedigree of the practice. Thus, the Court pointedly 
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ignored the Lemon test in its analysis in Marsh.236 But the 
practices of the county councils in Jackson and Rowan counties 
differ considerably from the practices approved of by the First 
Congress. Most importantly, the First Congress approved of only 
prayers given by third parties.237 Moreover, the resolution au-
thorizing congressional pastors required hiring two ministers 
from different denominations and alternating between the two 
houses of Congress.238 While Town of Greece held that the First 
Congress’s prayer practice provides an element of constitutional-
ity to similar practices held in different contexts, there is no rea-
son to think that it should extend to different prayer practices 
held in different contexts.239 Indeed, as this Section explains, the 
practice of having elected officials regularly deliver prayers to 
their constituents raises a whole raft of Establishment Clause 
problems beyond those contemplated in Town of Greece. Given 
the Court’s preference for prophylactic rules in this arena240 and 
the availability of perfectly constitutional alternatives, such as 
prayers led by third parties, per se unconstitutionality is the ap-
propriate approach to the practices at issue in Lund and 
Bormuth. 
The practice of legislator-led prayer in intimate gatherings 
with constituents entangles religion with political processes in 
two ways. First, it establishes an identity between democratic 
votes and prayer content. That is, when constituents vote, they 
vote specifically for the one person (or set of people) who may 
lead prayers at government functions. Because majoritarian 
votes fail to safeguard minority viewpoints, “fundamental rights 
may not be submitted to vote.”241 Second, even if no coercion is 
present during town meetings, legislator-led prayer necessarily 
injects religion into every decision made by citizen-participants 
and every political decision made by councilmembers. In other 
words, it has “divisive political potential.”242 
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Prayer practices that establish an identity between people’s 
votes and prayer content are per se unconstitutional under Santa 
Fe. In Santa Fe, the Court flatly rejected a proposed policy to al-
low students to officially lead prayers prior to football games at 
a public high school.243 One of the fallback options the school 
district (anticipating litigation) wrote into the policy was for 
students to vote on who could deliver reflective, not necessarily 
religious, speeches.244 
The Court ruled that this policy still violated the 
Establishment Clause by inviting divisive political potential, a 
component of the entanglement prong of Lemon.245 As part of 
this analysis, the Court noted that the exclusivity in who can 
give the prayers is constitutionally problematic—the policy is 
not neutral because (unlike in the later Town of Greece case) on-
ly the one person selected through majoritarian means may de-
liver the invocation.246 This necessarily will exclude people from 
minority or disfavored religions.247 Importantly, the Court did 
not hold or discuss that children in particular are more suscep-
tible to division than adults. Rather, it faulted the school district 
for encouraging the majoritarian voting mechanism in such a 
fraught arena, regardless of the age of the voters.248 Therefore, this 
case is still instructive notwithstanding the distinction between 
Weisman and Town of Greece that adults are more readily able to 
deflect coercive influences. 
There are other threads in the case law that confirm this 
reading of Santa Fe. For example, McCreary County and Van 
Orden distinguish between long-standing, established practices 
and those that are currently being implemented, particularly if 
the content is potentially explosive or sectarian.249 Professor 
Fallon wrote that this is the key distinction between the two: 
when the content is fixed and nondenominational enough, then 
religious symbolism is acceptable, but when the religious con-
tent is newly up for debate, then this raises the possibility that 
politics and religion will become entangled anew.250 
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The distinction between long-standing and novel practices is 
analogous to the distinction between third-party and legislator-
led prayer; in each pair, the latter is more divisive than the for-
mer. The content of the prayers was not meaningfully up for po-
litical debate in the Town of Greece case.251 After the opinion, the 
only political debate left for constituents and lawmakers in 
Greece is whether to maintain the prayer practice as is or abol-
ish it. Likewise, in Van Orden, the long-standing religious dis-
play could have been voted on, but changing the content to advo-
cate more or less strongly for different religions would have been 
forbidden under Fallon’s reading of the case.252 Having legisla-
tors lead the prayers themselves means that the content of each 
prayer is up for debate and disputation every few years with 
each new election. Lund and Bormuth are therefore closer to 
McCreary County, a case in which a new attempt to augment a 
Decalogue display was foreclosed because of its potential divi-
siveness.253 Because the contents of the prayers in Lund and 
Bormuth necessarily need to be debated in a political way every 
few years, they are constantly running afoul of the rule in 
McCreary County—and therefore are always running afoul of 
the Constitution. 
Moreover, a fact-sensitive review in both cases was more 
warranted than with legislative prayer—the religious content in 
the Decalogue cases was literally written in stone, whereas here 
it is constantly shifting, both from election to election and from 
prayer to prayer. Establishing a prophylactic rule with prayer 
cases thus also preserves judicial resources and prevents an in-
coherent doctrine, borne of several fractured opinions, from 
springing up. As evidenced by the Court’s enjoining a facially 
nonreligious fallback option in Santa Fe, it sometimes makes 
more sense to prevent repeated post hoc litigation testing the 
limits of the doctrine. 
One potential counterargument is that this approach fails to 
account for the constitutionality of congressional chaplains and 
the Court’s decision in Marsh. These are distinguishable for two 
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reasons. First, with congressional chaplains, there is no identity 
between one’s elected representative and the content of prayers; 
indeed, there are several steps between voters in Washington 
state and prayer content, delivered by a third-party officiant, in 
Washington, DC. This disconnect is underscored by the recent 
controversy regarding the House chaplain—citizens voted for 
representatives who, for their own pastoral care, hired a chap-
lain who criticized those representatives. Second, unlike in 
Marsh, attendees at a local government meeting are in closer 
proximity—both in terms of space and the legislators’ decision-
making authority—to their legislators than, for example, citi-
zens are to the House of Representatives. Thus, a case like 
Bormuth raises immediate constitutional issues because the 
council discussed religious matters with Mr. Bormuth and then 
came out against him on a nonreligious matter. By contrast, a 
House member leading a prayer thousands of miles away from 
her district in a venue where she does not interact with constit-
uents does not. The setting of a local county, city, or ward board 
meeting provides a unique set of facts in which constituents 
meet face-to-face with their representatives under the auspices 
of an official government function at which the representatives 
make decisions as a government entity.254 It should not be diffi-
cult for lower courts to identify these hallmarks of local govern-
ment meetings and distinguish them from, say, campaign events 
or remote legislative sessions. 
The practice of religious legislator-led prayer is also more 
likely to impermissibly inject religion into politics than is third-
party prayer. Several justices in Town of Greece emphasized 
that the town’s methods of selecting prayer givers were facially 
neutral.255 Thus, sometimes a Christian leads the prayer, and 
sometimes a Wiccan leads the prayer.256 In this abstracted neu-
trality argument, the Court can entertain the presumption that 
the councilmembers have no personal stake in the specific con-
tent of any given prayer. The councilmembers may disapprove of 
the third-party delivered prayer as much as the citizen at-
tendees. That presumption cannot stand when the councilmem-
bers themselves give the prayers. Even a respectful gesture such 
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as refusal to stand, or quietly stepping out, could be interpreted 
as a personal attack on the councilmember delivering the prayer 
and that councilmember’s religious beliefs. And that coun-
cilmember, unlike a third-party invitee, has tangible decision-
making power over the people in attendance for the prayer. 
This is a quintessential case that calls for the application of 
a prophylactic rule. The facts of Bormuth underscore this point. 
The plaintiff complained about the prayer practice and content 
and then applied for various positions in the county that re-
quired the board’s approval; the councilmembers colorfully criti-
cized his religious objections, and he subsequently did not get 
approval.257 The Sixth Circuit noted that there was nothing in 
the record suggesting that the board’s decision was animated by 
animus or was intended to coerce people into praying along with 
them.258 But that argument cuts as strongly against the court’s 
holding. As Strauss noted, because finding evidence of animus is 
so difficult, the Court has made the use of deliberately overin-
clusive prophylactic rules “ubiquitous.”259 Even if it is not part of 
the “real” Establishment Clause to forbid legislator-led prayer, 
judges have effectively no way to police the line between politi-
cal decisions made on the basis of sound policy and those in-
tended to punish religious minorities. A judge would have to be 
omniscient. Legislator-led prayer presents a particularly diffi-
cult case for judges—not only do judges have to determine which 
prayers “cross[ ] [a] line”;260 they would have to determine to 
what extent councilmembers consider constituents’ attentive-
ness during prayers when making government decisions. Like-
wise, as in the equal protection context, the Court is typically 
skeptical of a majoritarian institution making decisions that 
bear on someone’s constitutionally protected minority status.261 
While, per Town of Greece, prayers made before a lawmaking 
session may not coerce participation, they cast elected officials’ 
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decisions in a potentially unflattering light and could chill full-
throated democratic engagement.262 
One limitation to adopting a conclusive prophylactic rule 
prohibiting councilmember-led prayer is that it does not fully an-
swer all of the borderline cases that would be sure to arise if this 
approach is adopted. For example, occasionally members of 
Congress deliver prayers in the chamber—is that alright? When 
is a legislative session intimate enough that it raises entangle-
ment concerns? What if a councilmember makes an offhand re-
mark like, “Praise the Lord,” in response to good news from an 
attendee of the meeting? 
Policing the line between slipups and politically entangled 
practices is, mercifully, less difficult than the test announced 
in Town of Greece. In fact, it is quite a bit easier. Determining 
whether a prayer was off-the-cuff or part of a broader council 
practice seems like it would require less digging than investi-
gating whether the prayer was, in the totality of circumstances, 
coercive. 
The application of a prophylactic rule would also protect 
municipalities and legislators who wish to implement prayer 
practices. This is an easy-to-understand rule that preserves the 
core historical practice of third-party prayer. City councils in the 
Fourth Circuit have little guidance as to what impermissibly 
crosses the constitutional line, and protracted litigation is all 
but destined to ensue from district courts’ misapprehension of 
the newly announced test.263 And the Sixth Circuit’s Bormuth 
holding, even taken at its most expansive, does not shield mu-
nicipalities from litigation.264 Thus, applying a strong prophylactic 
rule is an improvement over either of the circuits’ approaches. 
Unlike the Fourth Circuit’s approach, this rule will be easy to 
apply and lead to more consistent outcomes, and unlike the 
Sixth Circuit’s approach, this Comment’s preferred rule ade-
quately safeguards constitutional rights. 
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CONCLUSION 
Despite the sundry tests and rules the Court has set out in 
other Establishment Clause contexts, its jurisprudence regard-
ing legislative prayer is remarkably barren. The Town of Greece 
decision did little to clear up outstanding confusion. With its 
numerous caveats and lack of a majority opinion, Town of Greece 
only slightly extends a small exception in the Court’s public 
prayer jurisprudence, finding that, when some factors are met, 
legislative prayer is presumptively constitutional—even when 
the prayer is sectarian and occurs in an intimate forum where 
citizens will interact with their representatives.265 
Due to the lack of clarity in Town of Greece, many questions 
pending its resolution went unanswered, particularly how courts 
should analyze prayer given at local government meetings by 
councilmembers themselves. Though Town of Greece explicitly 
reserves judgment on this question, it does imply that legislative 
prayer is not an “exception” to the Establishment Clause and is 
thus subject to tests similar to the usual Establishment Clause 
tests like any other state practice that may affect religion.266 
Therefore, the answers to the nascent circuit split between the 
Fourth and Sixth Circuits can be found in the Court’s other 
Establishment Clause precedents. Unlike the Fourth and Sixth 
Circuits, however, this Comment looked beyond the narrow co-
ercion test to consider in-depth how legislator-led prayer may 
warp political processes—and vice versa. 
Councilmember-led prayer is distinguishable from Town of 
Greece just as Town of Greece can be distinguished from Weisman 
and Santa Fe. In Weisman and Santa Fe, the presence of minors 
and possibility of surveillance (even at an after-school or non-
mandatory graduation event) made prayer in public schools per 
se unconstitutional. In contrast, the legislative context in Town 
of Greece turned what would otherwise be a clear-cut case of es-
tablishment into a presumptively permitted practice. 
In Lund and Bormuth, the identity of the person delivering 
the prayers changes the entire nature of the prayer practice. In-
stead of a facially neutral selection process, the prayer giver is 
decided by direct election. Moreover, it identifies any person’s 
reaction to the prayer with a direct statement about the coun-
cilmember’s faith. This makes the decision to leave during the 
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prayer much more fraught than in Town of Greece and renders 
subsequent council decisions involving the peaceful refuser sus-
pect. Though Lund, Bormuth, and this Comment’s proposed so-
lution seemingly turn the minutia of a county board meeting into 
a constitutional case, this is exactly the analysis the Court invited 
in tailoring its Town of Greece opinion to reach only prayers de-
livered by third parties. 
Finally, the stakes are high: “There are no de minimis viola-
tions of the Constitution—no constitutional harms so slight that 
the courts are obliged to ignore them.”267 Legislator-led prayers 
entangle government and religion and lead to divisiveness on re-
ligious grounds in a way that facially neutral third-party prayer 
giver policies do not. Even if the policy itself does not necessarily 
run afoul of the Constitution, it invites legislators to impermis-
sibly use religious criteria when considering their constituents’ 
individual claims. A strong prophylactic rule is therefore neces-
sary to prevent reviewing courts from unnecessarily policing 
prayer content or failing to remedy civil rights violations when 
they in fact occur. 
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